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Abstract 
 
Many nations are adopting higher education strategies that emphasize the development 
of elite universities able to compete at the international level in the attraction of skills 
and resources. Elite universities pursue excellence in all their disciplines and fields of 
action. The impression is that this does not occur in “non-competitive” education 
systems, and that instead, within single universities excellent disciplines will coexist 
with mediocre ones. To test this, the authors measure research productivity in the hard 
sciences for all Italian universities over the period 2004-2008 at the levels of the 
institution, their individual disciplines and fields within them. The results show that the 
distribution of excellent disciplines is not concentrated in a few universities: top 
universities show disciplines and fields that are often mediocre, while generally 
mediocre universities will often include top disciplines. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Education, with the resulting new knowledge creation and transfer, is the lifeblood 
of socio-economic growth. Universities are thus a cornerstone of the knowledge-based 
society. The substantial proof of the essential role of research in innovation and growth 
(e.g. Adams, 1990; Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; Mansfield, 1995; Griliches, 1998; 
Henderson et al., 1998) has clearly led many nations to invest in national scientific 
infrastructure and the higher education system. Such policies often pursue the 
development and strengthening of world-class universities (Mohrman et al., 2008; 
Deem et al., 2008), able to compete globally to attract talented students, faculty, and 
abundant funding. Salmi (2009) identified three possible strategies available to the 
decision maker who wishes to promote the birth of world-class universities: 
i) Strengthen a small number of existing universities to bring them to excellent 
level (picking winners), a strategy recently adopted by the German federal 
government, which has organized a national competition to award substantial 
extra funding. 
ii) Stimulate fusion of a certain number of institutions (hybrid formula) - this 
strategy is seen in France and Denmark, where individual universities and 
grandes écoles are exploring the feasibility of regional mergers. 
iii) Create world-class universities from scratch (clean-slate approach) – examples 
of this strategy are the series of Indian Institutes of Technologies, which 
implement a research policy agenda placing top priority on science and 
technology. 
Abramo et al. (2012) have proposed a fourth strategy, suggested particularly for 
undifferentiated non-competitive higher education systems: the spin-off of elite 
universities staffed with top scientists from existing ones. While it is obvious there is no 
universal recipe or magic formula for creating a world-class university, it is certainly 
possible to identify some of their characteristic features, such as high concentrations of 
talent, ample availability of resources and flexible models of governance. Yet in spite of 
attempts to define a vision and shared developmental strategy at the European Union 
level (EU Commission, 2003), the policies pursued by the member nations differ greatly 
from one another. Unlike certain other countries (with the United States and other 
“Anglo-Saxon” nations leading), the current situation in Europe is often one of excess 
public control, inefficient governance and chronic insufficiency of funds (Veugelers and 
Van der Ploeg, 2008). In the area of university governance, the OECD (2007) reveals 
that the most important driver of modernization in a university system is competition. 
The growth of world-class universities is favored by regulatory environments that 
introduce and permit competitive mechanisms for the stimulation of continuous 
improvement and the pursuit of competitive advantage. Aghion et al. (2009) show that 
universities’ performance is correlated with their autonomy and competitive 
environment. The level of competitiveness depends on cultural and other contextual 
factors, particularly the level of university autonomy, the type of financing and a 
government regulatory framework that is supportive in character. In competitive higher 
education systems, such as those observed in English speaking nations, the pursuit of 
competitive advantage has led to development of world-class universities that can 
attract, develop and retain highly-talented national and foreign faculty and students. The 
same institutions also obtain abundant public financing, private financing and 
donations, and attract venture capital and establishments of national and international 
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high-tech companies in their territory, with resulting social and economic benefits. The 
competition factor has generated universities that are distinct in their quality of 
education and research, and thus in prestige, and that offer degrees and produce research 
results that also stand out for their social and market value. Mechanisms for stimulating 
competition can be varied in response to the context, but such competition will 
inevitably lead to more efficient selection and continuous improvement. These 
competitive mechanisms have developed quite naturally in the Anglo-Saxon nations, 
with long-standing evolution of national policies that favored the birth and development 
of a true higher-education market, while the excess of public control seen in many 
European nations has inhibited the initiation of true competitive mechanisms and led to 
the development of a generally undifferentiated higher education system that is unable 
to compete at a global level for access to economic and human resources (public and 
private funds; talented students, excellent faculty) (Auranen and Nieminen, 2010). 
If the objective of government is to stimulate competition, and so lead to 
development of top universities that can compete internationally and produce the 
relevant socio-economic benefits, then some form of observation and monitoring of the 
situation is obviously useful. Other than monitoring performance itself, another 
indicator is the degree of concentration of performance within universities: the less that 
research performance is dispersed within universities then the greater is the probability 
of having top universities that are able to compete at the international level. In the case 
of Italy’s non-competitive higher education system, Abramo et al. (2012) found that the 
distribution of research impact among academics is generally highly concentrated on 
certain individuals, and further that there is more variability within the individual 
institutions than there is between universities as a whole. This seriously hampers the 
possibility of having top universities that are able to compete at the international level, 
since no single university reaches the critical mass of top performers able to attract 
relevant human and financial resources. To follow up on these findings in this work we 
wish to verify if the universities that place highest in national rankings also succeed in 
placing at the top of the productivity rankings for the single disciplines in which they 
operate. This is in fact what occurs in elite universities from countries with competitive 
higher education systems. In spite of the methodological weaknesses2 of certain 
international rankings (e.g. Times Higher Education Supplement3, Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University Ranking4 and QS World University Rankings5), these do provide a glimpse 
of such consistency in ranking. Taking the example of MIT, the institution as a whole 
inevitably places among the top in the global international rankings, but also for its 
individual subject areas of activity (Engineering & technology; Life sciences & 
medicine; Natural sciences; Social sciences & Management, as named in the QS 
rankings). The same phenomenon emerges at the next lower level: taking the example 
of Engineering & technology (again for the QS rankings), MIT still appears at top 
position in the world rankings for its individual constituent fields (Computer science 
and information systems, Chemical engineering, Civil engineering, Electrical 
engineering, Mechanical engineering). Our question is whether this situation is repeated 
                                                 
2The various weaknesses of these international rankings have been thoroughly examined and reported: see 
in particular Van Raan (2005). 
3http://www.thes.co.uk/worldrankings/, last accessed on July 1, 2013 
4 http://www.arwu.org/, last accessed on July 1, 2013 
5 http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings, last accessed on July 1, 
2013 
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in non-competitive higher education systems, meaning that the research performance of 
a university in its individual disciplines is more or less homogenous, or is in contrast 
highly variable. To respond to this research question we refer to the Italian university 
system, which has characteristics making it particularly suited to such an analysis. Most 
essentially it is absolutely non-competitive, but it also has another convenient and 
apparently unique characteristic: the fact that each academic is classified by research 
specialty in a unique field, named Scientific Disciplinary Sector, or SDS, of which there 
are 370 grouped in 14 University Disciplinary Areas, or UDAs. This classification 
scheme makes it possible to list universities research productivity ranking lists by fields 
(SDSs) and disciplines (UDAs), thus permitting an answer to the research question. 
To better explain the context for the analysis, the next section further describes the 
key characteristics of the Italian university system. Section 3 illustrates the 
methodology adopted to evaluate research productivity at the various levels of analysis, 
while Section 4 reports the results. The paper closes with the authors’ thoughts on the 
results and policy suggestions. 
 
 
2. The Italian higher education system 
 
In Italy, the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR) recognizes a 
total of 96 universities as having the authority to issue legally-recognized degrees. 
Sixty-seven are public and generally multi-disciplinary universities, scattered 
throughout the nation. Six of them are Scuole Superiori (Schools for Advanced 
Studies), specifically devoted to highly talented students, with very small faculties and 
strictly limited enrollment numbers per degree program. The 29 private universities are 
small sized; 94.9% of faculty is employed in public universities (0.5% in Scuole 
Superiori). Public universities are largely financed by government through non-
competitive allocation. Up to 2009, the core government funding (56% of universities’ 
total income) was input oriented, i.e. distributed to universities in a manner intended to 
equally satisfy the needs of each and all, in function of their size and activities. It was 
only following the first national research evaluation exercise (VTR), conducted between 
2004 and 2006, that a minimal share, equivalent to 3.9% of total income, was attributed 
by the MIUR in function of assessment of research and teaching quality. 
Despite some intervention intended to grant increased autonomy and responsibilities 
to universities (Law 168 of 1989), the Italian higher education system is a long-standing 
and classic example of a public and highly centralized governance structure, with low 
levels of autonomy at the university level and a very strong role played by the central 
state. 
In keeping with the Humboldtian university model, with its emphasis on the unity of 
teaching and research, there are no “teaching-only” universities in Italy, as all professors 
are required to carry out both research and teaching. Furthermore, the time to devote to 
teaching is established by law. All new personnel enter the university system through 
public examinations and career advancement can only proceed by further public 
examinations. Salaries are regulated at the centralized level and are calculated according 
to role (administrative, technical, or professorial), rank within role (for example: 
assistant, associate or full professor) and seniority. None of a professor’s salary depends 
on merit. Moreover, as in all Italian public administration, dismissal of an employee for 
lack of productivity is unheard of. 
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The whole of these conditions create an environment and a culture that are 
completely non-competitive, yet flourishing with favoritism and other opportunistic 
behaviors that are dysfunctional to the social and economic roles of the higher education 
system. The overall result is a system of universities that are almost completely 
undifferentiated for quality and prestige, with the exception of the tiny Scuole Superiori 
and a very small number of the private special-focus universities. In the period 2004-
2008, about 25% of professors had no impact on scientific progress, while 23% alone 
produced 77% of the overall scientific advancement (Abramo et al., 2011a). The 
problem is that this 23% of faculty is not concentrated in a limited number of 
universities, but is instead dispersed more or less uniformly among all Italian 
universities, along with the unproductive ones, so that no single institution reaches the 
critical mass of excellence necessary to develop as an elite university and compete at the 
international level (Abramo et al., 2012). 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Measuring research productivity 
 
Research activity is a production process aimed at producing and diffusing new 
knowledge. The new-knowledge production function has a multi-input and multi-output 
character, which makes the productivity of the total production factors not easily 
measurable. There are two traditional approaches used by scholars to measure the total 
factor productivity: parametric and non-parametric techniques. Parametric 
methodologies are based on the a priori definition of the function that can most 
effectively represent the relationship between input and output of a particular 
production unit. The purpose of non-parametric methods, on the other hand, is to 
compare empirically measured performances of production units (commonly known as 
Decision Making Units, DMUs), in order to define an “efficient” production frontier, 
comprising the most productive DMUs. The reconstruction of that frontier is useful to 
assess the inefficiency of the other DMUs, based on minimum distance from the 
frontier6. 
The measure of total factor productivity requires information on the different 
production factors by unit of analysis. Instead of total factor productivity, most often 
research administrators are interested in measuring and comparing simply labor 
productivity, i.e. the value of output per unit value of labor, normalized by all other 
production factors. When measuring labor productivity, if there are differences in the 
production factors (capital, scientific instruments, materials, etc.) available to each 
scientist then one should normalize by them. Unfortunately, in Italy relevant data are 
not available at individual level. We assume then that resources available to researchers 
within the same field are the same. A further assumption is that the hours devoted to 
research are more or less the same for all researchers. As we saw in the previous 
section, these assumptions are fairly well satisfied in the Italian higher education 
system, which is mostly public and not competitive. 
It has been shown (Moed, 2005) that in the so-called hard sciences, the prevalent 
form of codification for research output is publication in scientific journals. Such 
                                                 
6 For application of non-parametric methods to productivity measurements of Italian universities see 
Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003; Bonaccorsi et al. 2006; Abramo et al., 2008; Abramo et al., 2011b. 
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databases as Scopus and Web of Science (WoS) have been extensively used and tested 
in bibliometric analyses, and are sufficiently transparent in terms of their content and 
coverage. As a proxy of total output in the hard sciences, we can thus simply consider 
publications indexed in either WoS or Scopus7. With this proxy, those publications that 
are not censused will inevitably be ignored. This approximation is considered 
acceptable in the hard sciences, although not for the arts, humanities and a good part of 
the social science fields. As proxy of the value of output we adopt the number of 
citations for the researcher’s publications. Because the intensity of publication varies 
across fields (Garfield, 1979; Moed et al., 1985; Butler, 2007), in order to avoid 
distortions in productivity rankings, we compare researchers within the same field 
(SDS). It is very possible though that researchers belonging to a particular scientific 
field will also publish outside that field. Because citation behavior varies by field, we 
standardize the citations for each publication with respect to the mean of the distribution 
of citations for all the Italian cited publications of the same year and the same WoS 
subject category. Because research projects frequently involve a team of researchers, 
which shows in co-authorship of publications, productivity measures then need to 
account for the fractional contributions of single authors to outputs. The contributions of 
the individual co-authors to the achievement of the publication are not necessarily 
equal, and in some fields the authors signal the different contributions through their 
order in the byline. The conventions on the ordering of authors for scientific papers 
differ across fields (Pontille, 2004; RIN, 2009), thus the fractional contribution of the 
individuals must be weighted accordingly. Following these lines of logic, in our view 
productivity indicators based on full counting or “straight” counting (where only the 
first author or the corresponding author receive full credit and all others receive none) 
are invalid. The same invalidity applies to indicators based on equal fractional counting 
in fields where co-author order in the byline has recognized meaning. Finally, 
accounting for the cost of labor would require knowledge of the cost of each researcher, 
information that is usually unavailable for reasons of privacy. In the Italian case we 
have resorted to a proxy. In the Italian university system, salaries are established at the 
national level and fixed by academic rank and seniority. All professors of the same 
academic rank and seniority receive the same salary, regardless of the university that 
employs them. The information on individual salaries is unavailable but the salaries 
ranges for rank and seniority are published. Thus we approximate the salary for each 
individual as the average of their academic rank. 
 
 
3.2 Productivity indicators 
 
Based on the assumptions described above, the yearly average productivity over a 
certain period for researchers in a university in a particular SDS S is named Fractional 
Scientific Strength, FSSs, and calculated as follows: 
 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆 =  
 1
𝑆𝑅𝑆
∑
𝑐𝑖
𝑐?̅?
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑓𝑖 
                                                 
7 Although the overall coverage of the two databases does differ significantly, evidence suggests that, 
with respect to comparisons at large scale level in the hard sciences, the use of either source yields similar 
results (Archambault et al., 2009). 
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 [1] 
Where: 
𝑆𝑅𝑆 = total salary of the research staff of the university in the SDS, in the observed 
period; 
N = number of publications of the research staff in the SDS of the university, in the 
period of observation; 
𝑐𝑖 = citations received by publication i; 
𝑐?̅?= average citations received by all cited publications of the same year and subject 
category of publication i; 
𝑓𝑖 = fractional contribution of researchers in the SDS of the university. Individual 
fractional contribution equals the inverse of the number of authors, in those fields where 
authors appear in alphabetical order in the byline, but assumes different weights in the 
life sciences, where we give different weights to each co-author according to their order 
in the byline and the character of the co-authorship (intra-mural or extra-mural)8. 
Based on FSSs, we elaborate university ranking lists in each SDS on a percentile 
scale of 0-100 (worst to best) for comparison of absolute values of indicators relevant 
for all Italian universities active in the same SDS. 
At UDA level we aggregate productivity measures of SDSs in the UDA, 
standardizing them to national average and weighting for the relative salary cost of the 
SDS. In this way, we take account of the varying intensity of productivity for the SDSs, 
avoiding the typical distortion of measures at the aggregate level. 
The yearly average productivity 𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑈 of a university in a specific UDA U, is: 
 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑈 = ∑
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑘
𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑈
𝑀
𝑘=1
 
 [2] 
With: 
𝑀= number of SDSs of the university in the UDA U; 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = weighted9 average FSSS of all universities with productivity above 0 in the SDS 
k. 
𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑘  = total salary of the research staff of the university in the SDS k, in the observed 
period; 
𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑈 = total salary of the research staff of the university in the UDA U, in the observed 
period. 
Based on FSSU, we elaborate universities ranking lists in each UDA on a percentile 
scale of 0-100 (worst to best) for comparison of absolute values of indicators relevant 
for all Italian universities active in the same UDA. 
The same approach is used to measure overall yearly average productivity at 
university level, FSS: 
                                                 
8If first and last authors belong to the same university, 40% of the contribution is assigned to each of 
them; the remaining 20% is divided among all other authors. If the first two and last two authors belong 
to different universities, 30% of the contribution is assigned to first and last authors; 15% is attributed to 
second and last author but one; the remaining 10% is divided among all others. The weighting values 
were assigned following advice from senior Italian professors in the life sciences. The values could be 
changed to suit different practices in other national contexts. 
9Weighting represents the relative size (in terms of cost of labor) of the SDS of each university. 
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𝐹𝑆𝑆 = ∑
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑘
𝑆𝑅𝑆
𝑍
𝑘=1
 
 [3] 
With: 
𝑍= number of SDSs of the university; 
𝑆𝑅𝑆 = total salary of the research staff of the university, in the observed period; 
All other variables are as above. 
 
 
3.3 Dataset and sources 
 
Data on research staff of each university and their SDS classification are extracted 
from the database on Italian university personnel, maintained by the MIUR10. The 
bibliometric dataset used to measure productivity is extracted from the Italian 
Observatory of Public Research (ORP)11, a database developed and maintained by the 
authors and derived under license from the Thomson Reuters’ WoS. Beginning from the 
raw data of the WoS, and applying a complex algorithm for reconciliation of the 
author’s affiliation and disambiguation of the true identity of the authors, each 
publication is attributed to the university scientist or scientists that produced it 
(D’Angelo et al., 2011). 
Our dataset includes all universities active in the hard sciences. To ensure the 
representativity of publications as proxy of the research output, we include in the 
analysis only those SDSs where at least 50% of researchers produced at least one WoS-
indexed publication in the period 2004-2008. The dataset is summarized in Table 1 in 
terms of SDSs, university, research staff, publications, and citations for each UDA. 
 
Table 1: Research staff and scientific portfolio of Italian universities in 2004-2008, by UDA 
UDA SDSs Universities Research staff Publications* Citations 
Mathematics and computer sciences 9 63 3,515 13,955 33,697 
Physics 8 61 2,873 23,375 155,919 
Chemistry 11 59 3,603 24,570 168,723 
Earth sciences 12 48 1,439 4,641 20,422 
Biology 19 67 5,785 27,985 221,029 
Medicine 47 56 12,196 50,338 407,189 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 28 48 3,153 10,168 39,672 
Industrial and information engineering 42 68 5,489 32,188 79,421 
Total 176 77 38,053 164,632** 975,402** 
* Number of publications authored by at least one academic scientist of the UDA. 
** The value differs from the column total due to multiple counts for publications by co-authors 
belonging to different UDAs. 
 
 
4. Results and analysis 
 
We propose the following analysis to verify if universities that place in the top 
national ranks for overall productivity also succeed at placing in the top for the 
individual disciplines of their activity. We will prepare ranking lists at two levels: 
                                                 
10http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php, last accessed on July 1, 2013 
11www.orp.researchvalue.it, last accessed on July 1, 2013 
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 One for overall productivity at university level as defined in [3], and for reasons of 
significance including only those universities (61 in all) with a research staff of not 
less than 20 individuals in the SDSs that we are investigating. 
 One for each UDA, for productivity of universities at UDA level as defined in [2], 
and including only those universities with a research staff of not less than 10 in each 
UDA. 
The comparison of these ranking lists (Section 4.1) will then permit us to respond to 
our research question. 
Similarly, descending in level, we can also verify if the universities at the top in an 
individual UDA then also top the rankings for the individual constituent SDSs. For 
reasons of space, in reporting on this analysis (Section 4.2) we will present only the 
example of the Physics UDA. 
For each ranking list we classify the university placing in terms of merit, 
corresponding to quintiles of productivity: A, B, C, D, E, with A the best and E the 
worst. 
 
 
4.1 Overall productivity vs UDAs productivity 
 
The 61 universities analyzed vary in the scope of their disciplines (Table 2). Only 14 
universities are active in all eight of the UDAs considered; another 11 are active in 
seven disciplines. Seventeen universities are active in less than four UDAs, including 
four that are active in two UDAs and four in a single UDA. The area with the least 
number of active universities is Agriculture and veterinary sciences, with only 27. At 
the opposite extreme, Biology and Mathematics both have 49 active universities. In 
specific regard to the research question, a first observation concerns the lack of 
connection between the number of disciplines present in a university and its overall 
productivity. We find three generalist universities in the group of 12 for class A and 
another three in the group of 13 for class E; similarly, examining the universities with 
less than 5 active UDAs, we find 8 in class A but also 4 in class E. 
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Table 2: Bibliometric productivity classes (A the best, E worst) for Italian universities (data 2004-2008) 
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UNIV_1 - - - - A A - - 2 A 0 UNIV_32 C A B E D C - B 7 C 0.607 
UNIV_2 A A - - - - - - 2 A 0 UNIV_33 D A D B B C C C 8 C 0.455 
UNIV_3 - - - - - - - A 1 A N.A. UNIV_34 A D C D A D D A 8 C 0.616 
UNIV_4 - - - - - A - - 1 A N.A. UNIV_35 B D A - B C - C 6 C 0.525 
UNIV_5 A A - - - - - A 3 A 0 UNIV_36 E B E - A B D E 7 C 0.750 
UNIV_6 A B - - A - - - 3 A 0.250 UNIV_37 C D A C C D - D 7 D 0.429 
UNIV_7 - - D - A - A - 3 A 0.750 UNIV_38 E E - - D C C - 5 D 0.450 
UNIV_8 A - - - A B A - 4 A 0.188 UNIV_39 A E C C C D - D 7 D 0.536 
UNIV_9 C C A A A A - A 7 A 0.357 UNIV_40 C - D - C - - - 3 D 0.250 
UNIV_10 B D A B B A A A 8 A 0.402 UNIV_41 - - - - E D B - 3 D 0.750 
UNIV_11 A A - - C A - C 5 A 0.450 UNIV_42 D E C C C D A B 8 D 0.549 
UNIV_12 D D C A B A A E 8 A 0.710 UNIV_43 C E B B E C E B 8 D 0.603 
UNIV_13 A B E - B - - A 5 B 0.675 UNIV_44 E C C C D D B D 8 D 0.402 
UNIV_14 B B A A D B - A 7 B 0.429 UNIV_45 - - E B D - - - 3 D 0.750 
UNIV_15 C C B B B A B B 8 B 0.254 UNIV_46 E C E D C C - E 7 D 0.429 
UNIV_16 B E D - B B B B 7 B 0.464 UNIV_47 - - - - D E C - 3 D 0.500 
UNIV_17 - - - - - - B - 1 B N.A. UNIV_48 - - - - E D - - 2 D 0.375 
UNIV_18 C A C - - - - C 4 B 0.375 UNIV_49 D B C B C E C D 8 E 0.455 
UNIV_19 B B E A A - - D 6 B 0.725 UNIV_50 E - - - - - - E 2 E 0 
UNIV_20 A A A E - - - C 5 B 0.750 UNIV_51 C C D D - - E E 6 E 0.400 
UNIV_21 D C B C A B A - 7 B 0.500 UNIV_52 E A D D E - E - 6 E 0.600 
UNIV_22 B A B - B C - - 5 B 0.300 UNIV_53 D B E D E E E C 8 E 0.469 
UNIV_23 A D B A B A D D 8 B 0.603 UNIV_54 C E A - E E - E 6 E 0.650 
UNIV_24 B D A A B B D C 8 B 0.522 UNIV_55 - - D - E E D - 4 E 0.250 
UNIV_25 - - - - - - - B 1 C N.A. UNIV_56 E C E - D D - E 6 E 0.350 
UNIV_26 B B B - C - - C 5 C 0.225 UNIV_57 D - - - - - E E 3 E 0.250 
UNIV_27 - - - E E - - A 3 C 1 UNIV_58 E C A D D E C B 8 E 0.629 
UNIV_28 D - E A D B - - 5 C 0.750 UNIV_59 E E D E D E - D 7 E 0.196 
UNIV_29 B E B C C B - A 7 C 0.536 UNIV_60 D C E E E E E D 8 E 0.295 
UNIV_30 B D C - A C - - 5 C 0.525 UNIV_61 D - - E E - - E 4 E 0.188 
UNIV_31 E E - E - - - B 4 C 0.563             
 
 
4.1.1 Analysis of top and bottom universities 
 
An analysis of the top and bottom classes for overall productivity reveals that among 
the 12 universities in class A, the first five are at the top in all the UDAs where they are 
active. Four of these operate only in two UDAs that are closely related (e.g. Physics and 
Mathematics or Biology and Medicine). However this group of five includes two 
smaller Scuole Superiori and two private universities specializing in biomedicine. 
Beginning with UNIV_6, but still among the top universities for overall productivity, 
there is a continuous presence of UDAs that do not achieve level A. In UNIV_7, the 
Chemistry UDA places in Class D, the second last national quintile. For the three 
generalist universities (UNIV_9, UNIV_10, UNIV_12), performance is anything but 
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uniform: in UNIV_9 five “excellent” UDAs are paired with two that fall in class C 
(Mathematics and computer sciences, Physics). For UNIV_10,four out of eight UDAs 
are non-excellent, including one in class D (Physics). UNIV_12, the last of the top 
group, shows a number of mediocre UDAs, with Physics and Mathematics and 
computer science UDAs in the second last quintile and Industrial and information 
engineering UDA actually placing in the bottom class. 
Examining the rankings tail composed of the 13 universities in class E for overall 
productivity, we then find three excellent UDAs: Physics (UNIV_52) and Chemistry 
(UNIV_54, and UNIV_58).There are also a number of UDAs with performance placing 
in class B. One of the generalist institutions (UNIV_49) is particularly notable: this 
university is active in all eight UDAs, achieving good positions (class B) in Earth 
sciences and Physics and intermediate standing (class C) in Agriculture and veterinary 
sciences, Biology and Chemistry. 
Overall, we do not detect any clear stratification of universities on the basis of their 
research performance. Although appearing as a scattered minority, some excellent 
UDAs (class A) occur even in the tail of the general university ranking. At the same 
time, the universities that achieve overall excellent productivity include UDAs that do 
not reach the general standard of performance for their institutions. 
 
 
4.1.2 Performance variability of UDAs within universities 
 
As the measure of the potential mixed levels of performance of the UDAs active in 
each university, we calculate the index of mutual variability of the classes (A to E), 
symbolized Δ. This represents the average of the differences, in absolute value, of all 
possible pairs without repetition. In formulae: 
𝛥 =
∑ |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗|
𝑛
𝑖≠𝑗=1
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
 
 [4] 
Where: 
𝑥𝑖.= quintile of performance for the UDA i (1 the best, 5 worst), 
n = number of UDAs active at the university. 
We then examine the results for the standardized value R, obtained by dividing ∆ by 
the maximum of the  values registered for the 57 universities12. By definition, R 
assumes nil value in correspondence with nil dispersion in the performance of the 
UDAs, while an R value of one corresponds to the situation of maximum dispersion in 
UDA performance. 
Among the 57 universities there are four cases where R value is nil, however these 
concern highly specialized institutions with only two active UDAs (UNIV_1, UNIV_2, 
UNIV_50), or a maximum of three UDAs (UNIV_5). The maximum dispersion of 
performance (R=1) is registered for UNIV_27, which places in the bottom performance 
percentile (E) in Earth Sciences and Biology and the top (A) in Industrial and 
information engineering. 
Overall, we observe a Gaussian type of distribution for the R values, with the mode 
at the 0.4-0.6 inter-quintile, accounting for 36.8%of total observations. The median for 
                                                 
12Four of the original 61 universities under observation are excluded because they are active in only one 
UDA. 
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the R distribution is 0.455, which is the specific case for two generalist universities: 
UNIV_33, where UDA performance swings from A (Physics) to D (Chemistry, 
Mathematics and computer sciences), and UNIV_49, with two UDAs in class B 
(Physics, Earth sciences) and one in class E (Medicine).Taking a closer look at the other 
23 generalist universities (considered as having 7 or 8 active UDAs),we note that there 
are 14 cases where the value of R is above the median. However variability in 
performance does not result as correlated to the number of active UDAs: in fact the 
coefficient of correlation between the values in columns 10 and 12 (Table 2) is 0.28. 
 
 
4.1.3 Analysis by class 
 
Still examining the heterogeneous performance by the UDAs in individual 
universities, Table 3 presents the statistics from a series of analyses by group. For the 
universities in each quintile for overall productivity, the table shows the average 
distribution of the performance by the active UDAs. For example, the second line in 
column 3 shows that for the 12 universities in class A by overall productivity, the 
average percentage of UDAs with productivity in class A is 77%, while the remaining 
23% of their UDAs obviously register performance below “top”. The data that most 
clearly demonstrate the lack of consistency in performance are the values along the 
principle diagonal (highlighted in yellow)13. For the 12 universities placing in overall 
productivity class B, there are an average of 27% of UDAs in top class. For this same 
overall group, 15% of UDAs register productivity in class C, 10% in class D and 6% in 
class E. Among the group of 12 universities that register overall productivity around the 
national median (class C), we find that 15% of UDAs are excellent (class A). 
 
Table 3: Distributions of UDA productivity (by class, A the best, E worst) for universities grouped by 
overall productivity 
Overall productivity 
class 
N. of 
universities 
Average of 
A class 
UDAs 
Average of 
B class 
UDAs 
Average of 
C class 
UDAs 
Average of 
D class 
UDAs 
Average of 
E class 
UDAs 
A 12 77% 9% 7% 6% 1% 
B 12 27% 42% 15% 10% 6% 
C 12 15% 32% 18% 15% 19% 
D 12 3% 11% 31% 29% 26% 
E 13 4% 4% 12% 27% 54% 
 
 
4.2 UDA productivity vs SDSs productivity 
 
In this section we will compare the rank standings for productivity by universities 
active in an individual UDA to their rankings in the SDSs that compose it, to understand 
if the universities at the top in a given discipline are also top in the individual subfields. 
For reasons of space we present only the example of the Physics UDA, with its eight 
constituent SDSs14. For each of the 43 universities with at least 10 faculty in the Physics 
                                                 
13 The apparently greater homogeneity within the universities of the top and bottom classes is partially 
due to the fact that performance in the individual disciplines can be equal to or less (for those in top class) 
and equal to or greater (for bottom class), while it can be greater, equal or lesser for the other classes.  
14 FIS/01: Experimental Physics; FIS/02: Theoretical Physics, Mathematical Models and Methods; 
FIS/03: Material Physics; FIS/04: Nuclear and Subnuclear Physics; FIS/05: Astronomy and Astrophysics; 
13 
UDA, Table 4 shows the performance class for the overall UDA, for the SDSs active 
within that particular UDA, and the standardized mutual variability index R. 
 
Table 4: Productivity classes (A the best, E worst) for Italian universities in Physics: SDSs analysis 
(2004-2008 data) 
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UNIV_2 A - C A A A - A - 5 31 0.267 
UNIV_5 A A A C A - A - - 5 44 0.267 
UNIV_11 A A - A - - - B - 3 14 0.222 
UNIV_18 A A - A D - - - - 3 52 0.667 
UNIV_20 A A A C A - - - - 4 41 0.333 
UNIV_22 A A B A C A - E - 6 24 0.6 
UNIV_32 A C B B - D A A - 6 46 0.467 
UNIV_33 A A E B E - D E A 7 41 0.730 
UNIV_52 A C E A E - A A - 6 23 0.755 
UNIV_6 B E D A E C - - - 5 17 0.667 
UNIV_13 B A C D B E B C - 7 69 0.540 
UNIV_14 B B A C C B D B D 8 66 0.417 
UNIV_19 B C A A E B D A - 7 51 0.635 
UNIV_26 B D B B - - - D - 4 44 0.445 
UNIV_36 B A - - - - - D - 2 13 1 
UNIV_49 B B A A D D C D E 8 183 0.595 
UNIV_53 B A D D E C E A C 8 67 0.619 
UNIV_9 C B E D A D D B E 8 43 0.583 
UNIV_15 C C C C B B - C E 7 135 0.349 
UNIV_21 C C B E C B C B - 7 89 0.381 
UNIV_44 C B C D B A C A B 8 160 0.405 
UNIV_46 C B E B D - D A A 7 91 0.635 
UNIV_51 C C E - - - A - - 3 12 0.889 
UNIV_56 C C A B - - - C - 4 12 0.389 
UNIV_58 C B E D D - - E A 6 51 0.645 
UNIV_60 C D A D A E - D B 7 86 0.635 
UNIV_10 D E D E E A B C B 8 123 0.631 
UNIV_12 D D D B B D A C E 8 108 0.536 
UNIV_23 D D B B B E B B - 7 95 0.413 
UNIV_24 D B D C A E C D A 8 112 0.583 
UNIV_30 D B D E - - E E - 5 17 0.467 
UNIV_34 D C E E - - - B C 5 67 0.533 
UNIV_35 D D A D B D B E - 7 89 0.571 
UNIV_37 D D C D D A - B - 6 62 0.489 
UNIV_16 E E - E - - E A C 5 18 0.667 
UNIV_29 E E - E - - - E - 3 14 0 
UNIV_31 E E - E - - - - - 2 14 0 
UNIV_38 E E B E - - - D - 4 12 0.555 
UNIV_39 E E D C C C E C E 8 73 0.369 
UNIV_42 E E B E E - E D C 7 64 0.445 
UNIV_43 E E C C C B - C - 6 43 0.333 
UNIV_54 E D E C D E B E E 8 51 0.417 
UNIV_59 E D C B C C - E - 6 49 0.4 
 
Ten of the universities are active in all eight of the Physics SDSs, and further ten are 
                                                                                                                                               
FIS/06: Physics for Earth and Atmospheric Sciences; FIS/07: Applied Physics (Cultural Heritage, 
Environment, Biology and Medicine); FIS/08: Didactics and History of Physics. 
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active in seven. At the other end of the range, six universities are active in less than four 
UDAs, with two being active in only a pair of SDSs. Analyzing the distribution of SDSs 
within the individual universities we observe that FIS/01 (Experimental physics) is the 
most frequently present (42 universities out of 43), closely followed by FIS/03 
Materials physics (41 out of 43), while FIS/08 (History and teaching of physics) is the 
least represented (18 universities). 
In the nine universities at the top (class A) for overall productivity, we observe a full 
six SDSs in class E: FIS/07 in UNIV_22; FIS/02, FIS/04 and FIS/07 in UNIV_33; 
FIS/02 and FIS/04 in UNIV_52. At the tail of the UDA ranking, among the nine 
universities in the last quintile (class E) there is one excellent SDS (FIS/07 in 
UNIV_16) and a further five cases of SDSs in class B (FIS/02 in UNIV_38 and 
UNIV_42; FIS/03 in UNIV_59; FIS/05 in UNIV_43; FIS/06 in UNIV_54). 
Overall, the situation remains analogous to that seen in the previous section: 
descending a level in the analysis of productivity, we now observe that the universities 
at the top in a discipline (in this example, the Physics UDA) are often not at the top for 
the single fields that compose the UDA. Excellent SDSs occur in universities with UDA 
productivity that is below top, and vice versa. In general, it emerges that there is strong 
heterogeneity in the performance of the fields within the same discipline at an 
individual university. The standardized mutual variability index (R) data provide 
confirmation, showing a clearly Gaussian distribution, with the modal value at the inter-
quintile 0.4-0.6, accounting for 42% (18 out of 43) total observations. The maximum 
value is registered for UNIV_36, which is active in only two SDS (FIS/01, FIS/07), but 
with performance at almost opposite ends of the range (in this case A and D). UNIV_51 
also shows notable variability in performance, with one SDS in class A (FIS/06), one in 
class E (FIS/02) and an intermediate one in class C (FIS/01). Among the 20 generalist 
universities (7 or 8 active SDSs), 12 show a value for R that is greater than 0.5 and six 
show a value over 0.6. The university with the largest research staff (UNIV_49) is 
active in all eight SDSs and shows very high variability in performance (R=0.595) 
spanning the entire spectrum of five classes. The same occurs for UNIV_10, another 
large generalist university, with an R value of 0.631. We also note that the dispersion of 
performance among SDSs in a UDA does not seem related either to the size of the 
research staff (coefficient of correlation between columns 12 and 13, equaling 0.03), or 
to the actual number of SDSs active in the UDA (coefficient of correlation between 
columns 11 and 13, equal to 0.13). 
The heterogeneity in performance by the fields is also shown by the data in Table 5, 
which gives the statistics for an analysis by group. For the universities of each class (A 
to E) for productivity in Physics, the table indicates the average distribution of 
performance for the active SDSs in each institution. For example, the second line shows 
that for the nine “class A” universities for UDA productivity, the percentage of SDSs 
with productivity “not class A” is 44%, with this 44% distributed almost equally among 
the other classes. The most evident demonstration of the non-homogeneity of 
performance among the SDSs is the series of values along the principal diagonal 
(highlighted in yellow). Again, among the nine universities in class C for productivity in 
Physics (the median position in national ranking for this UDA), 18% of their SDSs have 
top productivity, while another 16% have productivity in the bottom class. We can 
conclude that, as seen for the level of UDAs, performance distribution at field level is 
substantially heterogeneous. Similar results were obtained from the analyses conducted 
for other UDAs. 
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Table 5: Distribution of SDSs by productivity classes (A the best, E worst) for universities in Physics 
UDA productivity 
class 
N. of 
universities 
Average of 
A class 
SDSs 
Average of 
B class 
SDSs 
Average of 
C class 
SDSs 
Average of 
D class 
SDSs 
Average of 
E class 
SDSs 
A 9 56% 11% 13% 7% 13% 
B 8 22% 18% 18% 27% 14% 
C 9 18% 26% 21% 19% 16% 
D 8 11% 28% 13% 26% 22% 
E 9 2% 10% 29% 12% 47% 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Many countries clearly look to the model of elite Anglo-Saxon universities as 
inspiration for national policies designed to strengthen scientific infrastructure and 
higher education systems. In the pursuit of this objective, it appears essential the 
selective public funding of the higher education system, a choice that implies a strong 
break with the past in the case of non-competitive systems. In such systems, the historic 
dispersion of public resources has actually undermined any opportunity for 
differentiation among universities and the development of top universities that can 
compete at the international level. The current study demonstrates that this dispersion 
also occurs within the individual universities. “Excellent” disciplines occur even in 
universities in the tail of national rankings for overall productivity, while single 
universities with overall excellent productivity repeatedly include disciplines that are 
below their institution’s overall performance. 
In addition to these observations we have added a further level of analysis at a lower 
level, examining the distribution of performance for the fields in the same discipline: in 
the individual universities, the excellent fields coexist with mediocre fields. 
This significant internal variability of performance in single institutions is likely not 
only a phenomenon of the Italian academic system, but more broadly of the majority of 
non-competitive higher education systems, determining the absence of any universities 
with a critical mass of excellence sufficient to aspire to the ranks of “elite” universities. 
We pose the question of whether the scattered capacities to produce excellent results 
could be better employed by concentrating such capacities, in terms of the available 
human and material resources, in a much smaller number of universities. With very low 
investment, it would seem possible to quickly create the type of elite universities that 
other competitive systems have produced over decades of time: universities capable of 
attracting the best faculty, students and public and private capital, and of providing 
much greater economic benefit than the present universities, with their high dispersion 
of internal performance. 
The authors sincerely hope that decision makers in undifferentiated non-competitive 
higher education systems will consider this policy option, particularly in the current 
times of economic crisis, which call for courageous and decisive choices for the future 
good of our nations. 
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